Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review · DODO AMM
- Sequence
- #2
- Score
- 42 → 42 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443508335
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-18T16:55:18.698Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- BsG8fGAh5mxmNA4fVmcAiTreHPVteSFS7BKhjPWC9AuL
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1378 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-18T16:55:18.552Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"3ff37634-d276-4760-a4b9-2c4b57a50a6d","new_score":42,"page_slug":"dodo-amm","prev_score":42,"reason":"The page's core narrative is well supported: a March 8, 2021 smart-contract exploit drained ~$3.8M from DODO's V2 Crowdpooling pools, and DODO's own account (corroborated by Quadriga Initiative) confirms ~$3.1M was recovered within 24 hours via attacker restitution and frontrunning-bot cooperation, consistent with the page's summary. All nine audit dates in the timeline match DODO's official security page exactly. Two defects were found: a wrong token-price figure (page says 6% drop to $3.84; contemporaneous reporting says ~2.55% to $3.94) and an internally inconsistent net-unrecovered-loss figure that conflates an early $1.89M recovery report with a later $3.1M final tally. The editorial language throughout is appropriately hedged (attack attributed to an external attacker, not to DODO), and no unhedged-allegation issues were found. No incidents beyond the single 2021 exploit were identified in five-plus years of subsequent operation, which is a point in the entity's favor that the page does not explicitly foreground.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}