Skip to main content
Sign in
← avoid.net

Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review · Curve Finance
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#4
Score
44 → 44 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
426514557
Off-chain at
2026-06-14T23:16:02.683Z
Anchored at
—
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
86iX57YrE4RGDhzNf5iLnancVeTWtBxfmnh7QWTJsXTB
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1915 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-06-14T23:16:02.628Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"108d7b65-7cee-4e16-a90a-10e0f4936e64","new_score":44,"page_slug":"curve-finance","prev_score":44,"reason":"Blue-chip calibration review (Prompt A). Verdict: over-penalized. Page content is treated as accurate; the trust_score band is miscalibrated. Curve Finance is a legitimate, major DeFi protocol that was a victim of an upstream third-party compiler vulnerability (Vyper), not its own fraudulent conduct or direct engineering negligence. The July 2023 exploit was caused by a reentrancy bug in Vyper versions 0.2.15-0.3.0 — a bug in an external toolchain that Curve relied on in good faith. Critically, 73% of stolen funds were recovered within days, and the DAO voted with 94% approval to compensate the remaining ~$18M in losses, making affected liquidity providers substantially whole by December 2023. As of June 2026 the protocol continues operating with ~$2.2B TVL and no regulatory enforcement actions. Under the post-policy band semantics, a score of 44 (WARNING: elevated fraud/loss risk or unresolved severe incident) overstates the current risk profile: the incident is resolved, funds were compensated, and there is no evidence of fraud, misrepresentation, or Ponzi mechanics. A score of 62 in the CAUTIONARY band (legitimate with material caveats) accurately reflects the reality: Curve is operational and reputable but carries a documented history of a significant exploit and the reputational/systemic risk of Egorov's concentrated CRV borrowing behavior. The one minor factual inaccuracy on the page — stating Vyper v0.3.1 fixed the bug in January 2022, when sources consistently date the fix to December 2021 — does not materially change the narrative.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}