Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · OFAC ISIS-K 134-Address SDN Batch (July 2026)
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 0 → 0 (-12)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443521964
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-26T19:11:16.380Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- A5MwQXvpeAX4ojcE9izaqq1cXuVJKi8HwtY9MivYGT8m
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2219 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-26T19:11:15.940Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"cc3a88d5-1ffa-41bd-b385-ee5e1f6acec5","new_score":0,"page_slug":"ofac-isis-k-134-address-sdn-batch-july-2026","prev_score":0,"reason":"The page's central claims hold up under review: the 134-address count (131 TRON, 3 Monero) is corroborated across multiple independent outlets and is consistent with OFAC's own July 1, 2026 notice, the Executive Order 13224 citation for the ISIL-Khorasan update is correct with no improper bundling of unrelated designees, and the separate June 22, 2026 facilitator action is verified in full against Treasury's own press release, correctly separating three newly-designated individuals from one already sanctioned in 2016 (claim_findings[3], [20], and their corresponding timeline entries). Against that, four dates on the page are wrong or unsupported by their own cited sources: Ali Shafiu's 2023 designation is a month early (claim_findings[28]), an ISKP financier's arrest is placed roughly five months off from the underlying case record (claim_findings[30]), Ozgur Altun's capture date conflicts with converging independent reporting (claim_findings[35]), and a 2022 on-chain-fundraising start date is not supported by the page's own cited source (claim_findings[27]) -- several fall on the first of a month, consistent with a pattern of overstated date precision rather than four unrelated slips. A high-priority coverage gap also notes the page's central address count is never sourced directly to OFAC's own list, only to third-party analytics (coverage_gaps[0]), and a crypto-related accusation against Ozgur Altun and his wife Ayse Altun rests on a single source, unmentioned in two dedicated journalistic profiles of the same arrest (claim_findings[18]) -- a reputational-risk concern given the subject is terrorism financing. With disputed_pct at 23.1%, squarely in the 10-30% band, and no link rot or authority-bundling problems found, a moderate revise penalty is warranted rather than escalation to denial or delisting.","score_delta":-12,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}