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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review · Dunamu / Upbit
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#4
Score
30 → 30 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
459451252
Off-chain at
2026-10-21T01:48:12.445Z
Anchored at
2026-10-21T01:48:14.851Z
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
AmdnNaDquSNdSZkUWuqh1mZ48PibBwgQaJ5TaXNqXcpY
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1889 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"55e0a13247500f634348c8c17a39d1f0","decided_at":"2026-10-21T01:48:12.263Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.2381,"findings_hash":"HSMHeKuXwYYMy1jt7Bg9mosB3iMJZT2S8ezDXVdUidDJ","investigation_id":"f4b7d1d8-e03d-4c79-be28-f2db3d0ce5f5","mode":"findings_only","new_score":30,"page_content_hash":"cced3a16f320dc24658a2c3f74ddb83ec231419b169f35ba1e5266c7d48c7d48","page_slug":"dunamu-upbit","prev_score":30,"reason":"The page's central narrative — the November 27, 2025 Solana hot-wallet breach, its scale, the Lazarus attribution, the parallel AML/KYC enforcement action, and the July 2026 FSS sanction process — is well supported by credible, independently verifiable reporting, and most dates and figures check out against primary and secondary sources. However, the review found a real and repeated error: the page states the FIU's 35.2 billion KRW fine was imposed in February 2025 alongside the CEO warning and suspension, when multiple sources place the fine itself in November 2025, roughly nine months later. A second recurring error mischaracterizes an April 2026 court ruling as a 'partial reversal' of the transfer suspension when the ruling fully cancelled it. The page's 80-90% domestic market-share figure is sourced to a 2023 report and is stale relative to 2025-2026 data showing a decline to roughly 60-70%; similarly, the stated December 31, 2026 merger completion date has been superseded by an October 7, 2026 filing pushing it to March 31, 2027. One cited source (amlintelligence.com) is dead, and two specific violation-count figures that appear to rely on it (34,777 KYC violations; 5,785 address errors) could not be corroborated elsewhere and conflict in scale with other reporting.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}