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AVOID.NET
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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#3
Score
20 (-8)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443519693
Off-chain at
2026-08-26T08:03:27.875Z
Anchored at
Block time

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
CaE5WDFyaUTXMuwhVDkdebxkab3g3hVcUy8PGJ3bmhc5
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1818 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-26T08:03:27.669Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"4f465022-8404-4177-bf02-a31c259a5e60","new_score":0,"page_slug":"kelpdao-bridge-exploit-april-2026","prev_score":2,"reason":"Of 19 checked claims, 11 were confirmed, 2 partially supported, 1 disputed, 4 unverifiable, and 1 stale, putting disputed_pct at 26.3% (claim_findings[4] and the four unverifiable entries) — within the minor-issues band. The page's central facts (loss amount, attack mechanism, Aave exposure figures, and the Arbitrum freeze) are all confirmed and, notably, more accurate and internally consistent than two sibling AVOID.NET pages covering the same incident. The one substantiated problem is claim_findings[4]: the page implies the KelpDAO and Drift Protocol hacks trace to the 'same' DPRK subunit, while the cited analytical source (TRM Labs) treats them as distinct clusters — a real but secondary attribution overreach, not a core-fact error. The four unverifiable items (claim_findings[8], [16], [17], [18]) concern peripheral figures — a TVL percentage, a token-supply ratio, a protocol count, and product-naming details — that the review could not independently corroborate but also did not find contradicted, consistent with search-scope limits rather than page defects. claim_findings[11] is a completeness gap, not an inflation of wrongdoing: the page leaves the LayerZero/KelpDAO blame dispute open when LayerZero's later admission of fault actually resolved it in KelpDAO's favor. No coverage gap was flagged high priority, and reviewer confidence (0.72) is moderate, supporting a light penalty near the low end of the applicable band.","score_delta":-8,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}