Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Superfluid
- Sequence
- #5
- Score
- 65 → 65 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 465107329
- Off-chain at
- 2026-11-04T00:53:23.923Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-11-04T00:53:37.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-11-04T00:53:37.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 7RpNFEKUBxot9uhbee9nXgvVerNEYse9ZrvXRkmpfuXN
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1865 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"90eeae5d06d30d9e5bce05a564f9a94e","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-11-04T00:53:23.588Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.25,"investigation_id":"3fa226c1-40b6-4785-9498-9ad2b6d997fb","judge_def_hash":"750934ecb48272224909b7430fab271676d391380fbc821acbe7ee7e4cac2fa3","new_score":65,"page_slug":"superfluid","prev_score":65,"reason":"Of 8 claims checked, none were disputed and 2 could not be verified (claim_findings[2] Tornado Cash funding, claim_findings[6] November 2025 TGE date), giving 25% by claim count (minor band). The February 2022 exploit core (date, time, amount, attacker address) is confirmed by Rekt. However, the page does not mention the September 2026 Celo/GoodDollar exploit (omission_findings[0], material), and its statement that the protocol continued operating with additional audits is incomplete without it, so the verdict is escalated to the significant band. The SUP allocation figures on the page sum to 135% and omit the foundation line (claim_findings[5]). The reviewer's confidence was moderate (0.5), so the penalty sits in the lower half of the band.","reviewer_def_hash":"3839668b232611e5b26db72079d64745f8e57e919b8a379e79b44ba4a52c845b","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":5,"severity_override":{"applied":true,"band":"significant","from_band":"minor","reason":"omission_findings[0] is a material omission: a September 2026 exploit in Superfluid's Celo deployment (GoodDollar reserve losses over $100,000) is documented by an accepted submission and a Tier 2 source, and the page's security history stops at 2025. subject_status.contradicts_page is true. The 25% claim-level rate understates this, so the page is judged in the significant band."},"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}