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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review_revise · Polkadot (DOT)
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#3
Score
62 → 54 (-8)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443512032
Off-chain at
2026-08-25T07:05:01.378Z
Anchored at
—
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
CCiUvWrsBU8FNKyKgmcd5eLhZzADtAN7xRBHCnFzG6Ad
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1916 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-25T07:05:01.163Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"98b78ed6-e47d-48f6-99c6-5d091e26f8cc","new_score":54,"page_slug":"polkadot-dot","prev_score":62,"reason":"Most of this page checks out: 27 of 38 fact-checked claims (71%) were independently confirmed, and the raw disputed rate (claim_findings summary, disputed_pct 0.0789) is low. However, two of the non-confirmed findings sit inside the page's own highest-severity sections and are more than minor imprecision. claim_findings[24] states the treasury posted nearly 101,000 DOT in negative net flows in Q4 2025, but the page's own cited treasury report says the opposite — a net profit, described as the first positive quarterly result since OpenGov governance began. claim_findings[18] gives the Hyperbridge exploit loss as $237,000–$250,000; that was accurate on the day, but Hyperbridge itself later revised the loss to roughly $2.5 million, about ten times higher, and the page does not disclose the revision — compounded by claim_findings[20], which describes the exploit as contained to the Ethereum side when losses actually spanned four chains. A smaller, lower-stakes discrepancy also appears at claim_findings[30] (a cited 3.6% price move versus 3.02% in the page's own source) and claim_findings[13] (naming one ETF custodian where reporting describes three). Because the two most consequential errors both understate or reverse negative outcomes in the sections the page itself labels high severity (the treasury and exploit sections), rather than being scattered minor date or wording slips, we are treating this page as needing correction rather than a clean pass, with a modest score penalty reflecting that the overall claim base is still largely sound.","score_delta":-8,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}