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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review · Balancer
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#7
Score
66 → 66 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
457470555
Off-chain at
2026-10-16T02:27:57.714Z
Anchored at
2026-10-16T02:28:22.882Z
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
5Ln2RdfdkotnsxK6k7ZxcqFcaM9uAya1NiBXS8LfZHzH
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2269 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"33e118d471ca6462b4d3a02ad129dce6","decided_at":"2026-10-16T02:27:57.521Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.2941,"findings_hash":"7rNyRznu8fYuGCaqMgfs7t7j962McyJdHRD6Sbr1HHS8","investigation_id":"36f75834-67ae-4c11-b2be-78c9066f6778","mode":"findings_only","new_score":66,"page_content_hash":"10111e0b66e809b0cc4c0b4ab0f884be4bc356ff0c5ec7ddb07da5e7ad928f8e","page_slug":"balancer","prev_score":66,"reason":"The page's core narrative -- six incidents from 2020-2025 totaling over $140M in direct losses, culminating in the $128.64M November 2025 ComposableStablePool rounding-error exploit -- is well supported by independent, credible reporting (Check Point, Trail of Bits, The Block, Decrypt, Cointelegraph) and matches the page's own cited sources closely on dollar figures, dates, and technical mechanisms. The most significant problem found is that the page's framing that the November 2025 vulnerability 'was not previously identified' and 'was not caught by any prior audit' is directly contradicted by the page's own cited Trail of Bits post-mortem, which states Trail of Bits had flagged the same rounding issue in a 2021 audit (undetermined severity, later out of scope) -- this appears twice and should be corrected as one defect. A secondary issue is the characterization of the September 2023 frontend incident as a confirmed 'BGP hijacking,' when Balancer's own post-mortem and most outlets describe it as DNS/registrar-level social engineering, a materially different attack vector than network-level BGP route hijacking. A handful of granular details in the November 2025 section (Hypernative timestamp, 53-minute copycat attack, Tornado Cash funding, the exact $130,000 Immunefi bounty for GothicShanon89238) could not be independently confirmed, though none were contradicted. The single biggest gap is the complete absence of any mention that Balancer Labs (the company) announced its own shutdown in March 2026 as a direct consequence of the November 2025 hack -- a major, more recent development affecting the entity's current status that should be incorporated.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":7,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}