Skip to main content
AVOID.NET
← avoid.net

Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review · More Markets
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#5
Score
26 → 26 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
457683179
Off-chain at
2026-10-16T15:12:16.754Z
Anchored at
2026-10-16T15:12:42.321Z
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
CCEcq1pPjrcC6oR8E4J4LVvjaKXiCpGky9ABGQVU5KuZ
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1982 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"bea9b0cba8749715ad1211d1b2c121df","decided_at":"2026-10-16T15:12:16.503Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.2308,"findings_hash":"64oVCFQZSvYQDLkZQkbk291eQau3EoQu3wHR7BKVVyqc","investigation_id":"3bc40226-b428-428b-b2ef-cb5f01f547a3","mode":"findings_only","new_score":26,"page_content_hash":"60d782f0b5d5d46a13415a2e608548addddc39e4a87bb063976e6bd1fee55388","page_slug":"more-markets","prev_score":26,"reason":"The page's core narrative — a Blockaid-detected exploit of More Markets' E-Mode/ankrFLOW collateral mechanism on August 31, 2026 — is well sourced and its technical mechanism (LTV figures, unbacked ankrFLOW minting, documentation quotes) checks out against the cited and independently retrieved sources. However, the page's central framing that the true loss amount and root-cause attribution remained unresolved and unverified 'as of the date of this report' is stale: Flow Foundation published an official statement on September 1, 2026 (not cited anywhere on the page) that identifies the root cause as an Ankr smart contract and puts the actual loss at roughly $410,000 (attacker gain ~$246,000) rather than $9.3 million, and confirms no depositor lost funds. Two of the page's own cited articles (Crypto Briefing, crypto.news) have since been silently edited to reflect this corrected figure, meaning those specific citations no longer support the claims they're attached to. A separate, unrelated staleness issue affects the 'third DeFi lending exploit in five days' comparison section: the Tectonic/Cronos loss figure ($66-75M) was superseded by Cronos's own post-mortem (~$111.2M), and a DeFi-specific $139.7M August loss figure is mischaracterized as covering 'all platforms.' One source (coindesk.cc) is both dead and hosted on a domain that is not CoinDesk's actual domain.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":5,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}