Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Core Lightning (CLN)
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 52 → 51 (-1)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 461976863
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-27T06:55:52.939Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-27T06:56:25.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-10-27T06:56:25.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 5L2JuqVEDoziZi17p6djJBjA1nLKzBWgXuvuLoBAEf7M
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1967 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"635db73ed28a76030bba70a9bc5f06d8","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-10-27T06:55:52.532Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.3889,"investigation_id":"61a612f9-9887-4f5c-8afd-032e9ef11785","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":51,"page_slug":"core-lightning-cln","prev_score":52,"reason":"Of 18 checked claims, 3 were disputed (claim_findings[0] rebrand date, [9] and [10] the August 26 'emergency shutdown' framing) and 4 could not be verified from the cited pages ([1], [8], [11], [17]), giving about 39% disputed or unverifiable. Two more findings ([14], [15]) show the page's upgrade guidance is stale, because v26.06.9 (Oct 7, 2026) supersedes v26.06.8, and the page does not mention that release. The core October narrative (active targeting of v26.06.7 and earlier, v26.06.8 released Sept 22, no confirmed losses as of Oct 2) is well supported, so the page is not denied. The page needs correction, especially its security guidance, and its advisory claims need a primary source.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":-1,"score_limit":{"applied":-1,"limited":true,"proposed":-27,"rule":"limited_no_second_opinion","second":null},"sequence_num":3,"severity_override":{"applied":true,"band":"significant","from_band":"significant","reason":"The review reports a material omission (v26.06.9 security release of Oct 7, 2026) and subject_status.contradicts_page is true. The page tells operators to upgrade to v26.06.8, which is now superseded. The percentage band is already significant, so the override holds that band and rules out a lighter one. It does not go to deny because the core October narrative is confirmed and reviewer confidence is moderate."},"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}