Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 0 → 0 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443517021
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-25T19:47:12.945Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 4RZQJbKoQFJh7HajcS8WUfdKxfoJayA8aetxkfbWRWhA
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1994 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-25T19:47:12.569Z","decision":"review_approve","investigation_id":"8209129b-5275-4293-8467-0589f57906c8","new_score":0,"page_slug":"clickfix-macos-go-based-infostealer-crypto-wallet-drainer-august-2026","prev_score":0,"reason":"The reviewer checked all 48 individual claims on this page against the page's cited sources and found 44 fully confirmed and 4 partially supported, with zero claims rated disputed or unverifiable. AVOID's scoring formula counts only disputed and unverifiable claims against a page, so this page's disputed rate is 0%, placing it solidly in the approve range, and none of the four open coverage gaps are marked high priority, so no rule pushes the verdict to a stricter band. That said, three specific issues the reviewer surfaced are worth naming even though they do not move the score under the current formula: the page's own summary overstates the malware's Monero-draining capability in a way the page's own later section already corrects (claim_findings[1], claim_findings[13]); the mitigation section omits advice to move funds and rotate seed phrases after compromise, despite a source already cited on the page recommending exactly that for this wallet-draining malware (claim_findings[41]); and a November 2025 sanctions-timeline entry describes a joint US/UK/Australia action as an Australia-only round and misdates it by roughly two and a half weeks (claim_findings[28], claim_findings[44]). Because the reviewer classified all of these as 'partially supported' rather than 'disputed,' the scoring mechanism has no lever to penalize them, and gap priority did not clear the high-priority threshold needed to force a revise. This verdict is issued as approve per the formula, with these three items flagged as unresolved accuracy/safety issues that the score does not reflect.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}