Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 0 → 0 (-12)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443518172
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-25T22:56:54.330Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 3jS5ggwX7e5DZR1ywNmNVuvRTqG6t2XeK65EWKHNNxLE
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2617 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-25T22:56:54.074Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"28191458-9347-477f-9415-a6f195dea827","new_score":0,"page_slug":"irs-fake-digital-asset-compliance-portal-physical-mail-phishing","prev_score":0,"reason":"The reviewer confirmed 13 of 19 claims outright and found the page's core account of the scam — the fake letters, the spoofed portal, the vishing follow-up, the infrastructure, and the IRS's own July 30 fraud alert — well supported by primary and independent sources (claim_findings[0-3], [5-6], [8-9], [12-13], [15-16], [18]). Two problems keep it out of the approve band. First, the page attributes a direct quote to IRS-CI Chief Jarod Koopman ('professionalized international scam operation') that does not appear in his verifiable statements and appears to have been assembled from a separate description of hosting infrastructure (claim_findings[4] and its duplicate at [17]); presenting invented words as a named official's direct quote is a more serious defect than a misstated statistic. Second, the page contradicts itself on whether the IRS ever sends QR codes in official mail — the Attack Mechanics section says never, while the Official Response section correctly notes the IRS uses QR codes on legitimate CP53E notices (claim_findings[7], corroborated by claim_findings[13]) — a contradiction that, on a page meant to help readers tell real IRS mail from fake, could lead someone to wrongly dismiss a genuine notice as fraudulent. Two smaller issues round out the disputed set: the 2019 letter numbers cited (CP2000/CP2501) appear to be the wrong ones for that campaign (claim_findings[10]), and a claim that 'hundreds of thousands' of taxpayers received genuine compliance notices could not be confirmed, with only a figure near 10,000 substantiated for the original 2019 campaign (claim_findings[14]). Weighed against this, the reviewer confirmed that the IRS is consistently and correctly framed as the impersonated party throughout and that all victim mitigation advice is accurate and never points readers toward the fraudulent portal or QR code (claim_findings[13]) — the one defect that would have been disqualifying is absent. With disputed-or-unverifiable claims at 4 of 19 (21%), no high-priority coverage gaps, and a reasonably confident review (0.78), this falls in the lower-to-middle revise band: correctable defects, not a page that misleads on its central facts or protective purpose.","score_delta":-12,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}