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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review · Silo Finance
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#4
Score
47 → 47 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
457456697
Off-chain at
2026-10-16T01:38:07.973Z
Anchored at
2026-10-16T01:38:12.942Z
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
wCghCC5DhY7vnxtsR7KeH6bf6sWoJZRZB5bKYLvdoY7
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1786 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"39574799f7cf460eb458e46d7f657cd6","decided_at":"2026-10-16T01:38:07.709Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.1852,"findings_hash":"55FP2JMW2k6QRctHFiFaR36fmUQVQ3Zx8bGvejUUgt66","investigation_id":"56838e34-4563-4210-9f8e-bc439f96bf7c","mode":"findings_only","new_score":47,"page_content_hash":"bda4b741effc96af0390da1ce4222181f77fad7a07cb27c7adbb20ffe8e62365","page_slug":"silo-finance","prev_score":47,"reason":"The page's core narrative — Silo V1's isolated-market design, the April-May 2023 interest rate manipulation vulnerability, the July 2023 RAMSES incentives-contract white-hat drain, and the audit/deployed-code gap — is well supported by primary sources I was able to fetch directly (Immunefi's bugfix review, the RAMSES hackmd writeup, Certora's reports, and Silo's own devdocs). I found one clear factual error (the IRMv1 report date is April 28, 2023 per the page's own cited source, not April 27, appearing in both prose and timeline), one overstated claim about Certora's confirmation of the IRMv2 fix (the primary source is materially more hedged than 'confirming no remaining exploit vectors'), one misquote of devdocs language presented as verbatim, two dead citation URLs (resources.silo.finance, a dead domain, and immunefi.com/bug-bounty/silofinance/, a 404), and one source-scope mismatch (a risk-disclosure page cited for V1 is actually labeled Silo V3). The most significant omission is a June 2025 leverage-contract exploit affecting the broader Silo Finance entity (~$545K) that goes unmentioned anywhere on the page, even as context for the V2/V3 migration it does discuss.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}