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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review_approve · Yearn Finance DAI Vault Exploit
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#5
Score
44 → 62 (+18)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
426514580
Off-chain at
2026-06-14T23:16:03.228Z
Anchored at
—
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
9n3eEVCGtMwTHFbPFK8EtBQA1MS83MTXjYxKF5xUdFnJ
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1422 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-06-14T23:16:03.116Z","decision":"review_approve","investigation_id":"47882469-b5ed-42df-800b-ba3d06f5fe18","new_score":62,"page_slug":"yearn-dai-vault","prev_score":44,"reason":"This is a severity-calibration review, not a fact-dispute review. The reviewer found 0% of claims disputed and confirmed all material facts on the page: the $11M loss, attacker profit of ~$2.8M, flash loan mechanics, 11-minute incident response, full depositor reimbursement via 9.7M DAI minted through a MakerDAO CDP, and $2.317M in Nexus Mutual insurance payouts (claim_findings[0]-[4]). The entity is not fraudulent — the exploit was perpetrated by an external attacker against Yearn's v1 vaults, making Yearn the victim (claim_findings[1]). The incident is fully resolved: depositors were made whole and Yearn continues to operate as a legitimate DeFi protocol with V3 vaults and $600M+ TVL in 2026 (claim_findings[2]). The current score of 44 (WARNING band) implies 'elevated fraud/loss risk or unresolved severe incident,' but no fraud element exists and the incident is resolved. A CAUTIONARY band score of 62 — reflecting genuine historical negligence in v1 configuration decisions and the $11M scale of the incident — is appropriate per the band semantics.","score_delta":18,"sequence_num":5,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}