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AVOID.NET
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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#4
Score
0 → 0 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
461983459
Off-chain at
2026-10-27T07:19:42.731Z
Anchored at
2026-10-27T07:19:49.000Z
Block time
2026-10-27T07:19:49.000Z

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
7ZcZ1f8qWJzmLTyUfWijkV2vxJe6bHxyw3xe612KMN9m
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1774 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"2a960ae7d6359b8fae4595ff5bfdba40","band_override":null,"blocked_count":1,"decided_at":"2026-10-27T07:19:42.235Z","decision":"review_approve","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0,"investigation_id":"56eb1ee0-9db3-408e-9230-533176068d1b","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":0,"page_slug":"trapdoor-supply-chain-attack","prev_score":0,"reason":"Of 12 claim findings, none were disputed and one (claim_findings[1], the exact SlowMist quote) was unverifiable only because the source returned 403, so it is excluded; the disputed share is 0% of 11 counted findings. The technical core (package counts and names, trap-core.js size, detection statistics, targeted repositories, no confirmed victims) was confirmed against Socket, The Hacker News and CoinDesk. Five findings were partially supported and should be corrected: claim_findings[0] credits Socket with a superlative it did not make, claim_findings[2] presents the first upload time as the detection time, claim_findings[8] gives May 29 as the registry report date when that is only CoinDesk's publication date, claim_findings[9] calls The Hacker News 'initial' coverage although Socket published a day earlier, and claim_findings[7] attributes Socket's statement to CoinDesk. The only omission is minor (unconfirmed post-takedown re-publication) and the subject status does not contradict the page, so no override applies. Open coverage gaps are medium priority or lower.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":11,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}