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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#3
Score
20 (-10)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443514947
Off-chain at
2026-08-25T14:05:25.304Z
Anchored at
Block time

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
AhVKDF1wpQGxEbT3WzQvYKbWYMhy2Gmevt4q86eDjQTc
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2573 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-25T14:05:24.679Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"e620d5be-6208-44a1-89e0-67163f0f5c08","new_score":0,"page_slug":"ascendex-insolvency-and-withdrawal-freeze-july-2026","prev_score":2,"reason":"The page's core insolvency narrative is well supported: the reviewer independently confirmed the shutdown date and stated reasons, the $240M reserve drop, the $13.45M on-chain figure and its ASD/UNITE composition, the withdrawal-freeze mechanics, and the 2021 hack's dollar figures against primary and tier-1/tier-2 sources, and the page carefully distinguishes a withdrawal pause from a liquidity shortfall from a hedged insolvency warning without ever overstating that formal insolvency has been declared (claim_findings[6], [24], [25]). At 7.7% disputed, the raw ratio sits inside the approve band, but two disputed claims carry outsized weight and both also surface as high-priority coverage gaps. First, claim_findings[20] attributes the December 2021 hack to the Lazarus Group, a specific named state-linked threat actor, but neither of the page's own two cited sources mentions this, and a dedicated incident-tracking database states the attacker was never identified -- naming a specific perpetrator where the honest answer is 'unknown' is a serious, unsupported claim. Second, claim_findings[14], in the section on the failed strategic transaction that is central to the insolvency story, says the counterparty was undisclosed as of the investigation date, when AscendEX had apparently already named it (RIBK) in an official statement carried by a source the page cites elsewhere -- asserting concealment where disclosure had occurred is an unfair characterization of a distressed company, though the reviewer notes some uncertainty about whether that disclosure predates the page's investigation date. A third, non-disputed but flagged issue (claim_findings[16]) has the page's MiCA framing invert its own cited source, implying AscendEX's non-authorization signals unique dysfunction when the source shows most industry peers also failed to clear the bar. Together these are two specific unsupported/inverted claims that push blame or suspicion onto named parties without adequate sourcing, warranting a revision request rather than approval, but the strength of the remainder of the page and decent reviewer confidence (0.78) keep this in the low end of the revise band.","score_delta":-10,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}