Skip to main content
Sign in
← avoid.net

Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#4
Score
2020 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
426514224
Off-chain at
2026-06-14T23:15:44.856Z
Anchored at
Block time

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
8w3U1LLh7wsPpVWPuL1Syn6kyjrzAh3DnCjE5LFvvFPJ
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1741 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-06-14T23:15:44.802Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"4d531127-e978-430c-8f36-6eac186ef860","new_score":20,"page_slug":"yearn-finance","prev_score":20,"reason":"Blue-chip calibration review (Prompt A). Verdict: over-penalized. Page content is treated as accurate; the trust_score band is miscalibrated. Yearn Finance is a legitimate, actively-operating DeFi yield aggregator founded in July 2020, currently holding approximately $150M TVL with functioning V2 and V3 vaults and ongoing governance development. The page's current score of 32/WARNING is over-penalized because it conflates third-party exploits with Yearn's own security record: the Cream Finance $130M hack (where Yearn's oracle was an attack vector but Yearn assisted recovery), the Alpha Homora/Iron Bank $37M incident (where Yearn was a bystander), and the Iron Bank $32M bad debt freeze (an Iron Bank vs. Alpha Homora dispute) are all presented as Yearn incidents on the page's timeline. Stripping those misattributed entries, Yearn's confirmed losses are approximately $33M across four or five incidents over five years, all from legacy deprecated contracts with modern V2/V3 vaults remaining unaffected. The protocol demonstrates a pattern of legacy-code vulnerability combined with responsive remediation, which warrants a CAUTIONARY rating (50-69) rather than WARNING. There is no evidence of fraud, exit scam, Ponzi mechanics, or regulatory conviction — the SEC's inquiry into Cronje was an investigation that never resulted in charges, and Cronje publicly confirmed this in 2025.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}