Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review · Yearn Finance
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 20 → 20 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 426514224
- Off-chain at
- 2026-06-14T23:15:44.856Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 8w3U1LLh7wsPpVWPuL1Syn6kyjrzAh3DnCjE5LFvvFPJ
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1741 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-06-14T23:15:44.802Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"4d531127-e978-430c-8f36-6eac186ef860","new_score":20,"page_slug":"yearn-finance","prev_score":20,"reason":"Blue-chip calibration review (Prompt A). Verdict: over-penalized. Page content is treated as accurate; the trust_score band is miscalibrated. Yearn Finance is a legitimate, actively-operating DeFi yield aggregator founded in July 2020, currently holding approximately $150M TVL with functioning V2 and V3 vaults and ongoing governance development. The page's current score of 32/WARNING is over-penalized because it conflates third-party exploits with Yearn's own security record: the Cream Finance $130M hack (where Yearn's oracle was an attack vector but Yearn assisted recovery), the Alpha Homora/Iron Bank $37M incident (where Yearn was a bystander), and the Iron Bank $32M bad debt freeze (an Iron Bank vs. Alpha Homora dispute) are all presented as Yearn incidents on the page's timeline. Stripping those misattributed entries, Yearn's confirmed losses are approximately $33M across four or five incidents over five years, all from legacy deprecated contracts with modern V2/V3 vaults remaining unaffected. The protocol demonstrates a pattern of legacy-code vulnerability combined with responsive remediation, which warrants a CAUTIONARY rating (50-69) rather than WARNING. There is no evidence of fraud, exit scam, Ponzi mechanics, or regulatory conviction — the SEC's inquiry into Cronje was an investigation that never resulted in charges, and Cronje publicly confirmed this in 2025.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}