Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review · Zilliqa
- Sequence
- #6
- Score
- 65 → 65 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 457760368
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-16T19:51:24.607Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-16T19:51:40.085Z
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 9EYDVsVtweicpktinULjF2pdQF1Vc4R1aDcwNGWJqk2X
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2013 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"1672add0cedab60309bd75bcdbbf7eaa","decided_at":"2026-10-16T19:51:24.411Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.1429,"findings_hash":"HgEYaeVcNKTUBvSXF3vya4HMrjXgqXmepuRWU149zike","investigation_id":"ce7cc7ce-9d4c-4917-970b-fdb83d8d0837","mode":"findings_only","new_score":65,"page_content_hash":"9d6d70fdf3903d5e2ea131876907d165a18cfb85a5e326620fb9fb1939081a5b","page_slug":"zilliqa","prev_score":65,"reason":"The page's core factual claims are well-supported where checked: the February 2025 X-Bridge exploit figures match Zilliqa's official blog precisely, the CEO resignation timing and framing are accurately and cautiously stated, the July 2026 cold-wallet incident's broad contours (unnamed exchange, Bitget's 'wallet maintenance' framing, price/volume figures, single-sourced 'legacy ZIL1 wallet' attribution) are all confirmed against the cited and independent reporting, and the project-background section's founding, audit, and no-enforcement-action claims hold up. However, the page has gone stale in a significant way: it was evidently finalized shortly after the July 20-21, 2026 incident and repeatedly hedges that Zilliqa's post-mortem 'had not yet been published' and the exchange's identity and stolen quantity were undisclosed — but Zilliqa published a post-mortem in late August 2026 disclosing a theft of roughly 683 million ZIL and attributing it to a Ledger hardware-wallet entropy flaw, which the page does not reflect at all. Separately, one sentence claiming 'a separate, distinct incident from March 2025' generated Bithumb speculation could not be substantiated by any of the page's own cited sources or by independent search, and appears to be an erroneous or fabricated addition. A minor sourcing issue was also found in how the page frames a CryptoTimes paraphrase as a second verbatim Zilliqa quote.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":6,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}