Skip to main content
AVOID.NET
← avoid.net

Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review_revise · Volo Protocol
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#3
Score
4737 (-10)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443525388
Off-chain at
2026-08-27T10:49:45.238Z
Anchored at
Block time

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
EoU18Hw2V9L6tkCs2SpcFMyvwxaNK51scU3RV7bBu1u2
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1942 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-27T10:49:44.602Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"0c625ed3-6bc1-4649-a726-569f64e5e919","new_score":37,"page_slug":"volo-protocol","prev_score":47,"reason":"The review's own summary block miscalculated disputed_pct as 0.18; recomputed directly from the 12-item findings array per spec (disputed + unverifiable, divided by total claims), the correct figure is (0+1)/12 = 0.083, which sits in the approve band on arithmetic alone. Nine of twelve claims -- including the NAVI acquisition, the five audits, the $3.5M exploit breakdown, the compromised-key root cause, and the KelpDAO comparison -- were independently confirmed (claim_findings[0,1,3,4,5,6,7,8,11]), and zero claims were disputed. However, claim_findings[9] found that the page's exploit-aftermath sections describe roughly $3 million as unrecovered, when independent reporting within a week of the incident (rekt.news, Phemex) showed about 90% of funds were recovered, leaving a true net loss near $60,000 -- a nearly 50x overstatement of harm to the named subject that was never corrected. Because the reviewer flagged this same gap as a high-priority coverage item, and because it represents a live, material inaccuracy rather than a mere absence of coverage, it is treated as grounds to move the verdict one step past a pure arithmetic approve, into a light revise rather than a hold at zero penalty. The claim_findings[10] unverifiable item (absence of public key-management documentation) is explicitly noted by the reviewer as a tooling limitation rather than a substantive defect and is not weighted further. claim_findings[2] (TVL comparison to SpringSui) is only partially supported due to near-parity in some snapshots, a minor precision issue rather than a factual error.","score_delta":-10,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}