Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Volo Protocol
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 47 → 37 (-10)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443525388
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-27T10:49:45.238Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- EoU18Hw2V9L6tkCs2SpcFMyvwxaNK51scU3RV7bBu1u2
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1942 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-27T10:49:44.602Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"0c625ed3-6bc1-4649-a726-569f64e5e919","new_score":37,"page_slug":"volo-protocol","prev_score":47,"reason":"The review's own summary block miscalculated disputed_pct as 0.18; recomputed directly from the 12-item findings array per spec (disputed + unverifiable, divided by total claims), the correct figure is (0+1)/12 = 0.083, which sits in the approve band on arithmetic alone. Nine of twelve claims -- including the NAVI acquisition, the five audits, the $3.5M exploit breakdown, the compromised-key root cause, and the KelpDAO comparison -- were independently confirmed (claim_findings[0,1,3,4,5,6,7,8,11]), and zero claims were disputed. However, claim_findings[9] found that the page's exploit-aftermath sections describe roughly $3 million as unrecovered, when independent reporting within a week of the incident (rekt.news, Phemex) showed about 90% of funds were recovered, leaving a true net loss near $60,000 -- a nearly 50x overstatement of harm to the named subject that was never corrected. Because the reviewer flagged this same gap as a high-priority coverage item, and because it represents a live, material inaccuracy rather than a mere absence of coverage, it is treated as grounds to move the verdict one step past a pure arithmetic approve, into a light revise rather than a hold at zero penalty. The claim_findings[10] unverifiable item (absence of public key-management documentation) is explicitly noted by the reviewer as a tooling limitation rather than a substantive defect and is not weighted further. claim_findings[2] (TVL comparison to SpringSui) is only partially supported due to near-parity in some snapshots, a minor precision issue rather than a factual error.","score_delta":-10,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}