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AVOID.NET
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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review_revise · GeniusAI
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#4
Score
60 → 60 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
464344663
Off-chain at
2026-11-02T03:30:05.803Z
Anchored at
2026-11-02T03:30:30.000Z
Block time
2026-11-02T03:30:30.000Z

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
52v7jX6nX7RKncJRhruPgUuJNSAZFW1P54VPEZzBAbri
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1543 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"a8dcd5f6a22f7ae5c4f11b01556b71bd","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-11-02T03:30:05.576Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.4286,"investigation_id":"9caf0d23-f3a5-4cfd-8cc2-13b8afe83513","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":60,"page_slug":"geniusai","prev_score":60,"reason":"The core exploit account (May 5, 2024, about $1.27M, Discord-derived key, 100M counterfeit tokens) was corroborated by two sources (claim_findings[0]). However, 3 of 7 checked claims (about 43%) were disputed or could not be verified: the 80% remediation figure is attributed to CertiK but is the project's own goal (claim_findings[1]), the bounty, $1 repurchase and buyback details were not found in the cited sources (claim_findings[2]), and the ZachXBT flag, which is repeated in the page summary, is not supported by any cited source (claim_findings[4]). The price range is also out of date (claim_findings[6]). The penalty sits at the milder end of the band because the reviewer's confidence is moderate (0.5), the central exploit facts hold, and the only omission (contract proxy risk) is minor. A high-priority gap remains: no on-chain evidence such as transaction hashes or attacker addresses.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}