Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
- Sequence
- #6
- Score
- 34 → 34 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 457895496
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-17T03:58:21.607Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-17T03:58:51.190Z
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 9iDYi5tQERLexW4g7cvz5ox9DrdNnk8R37EqLduUWN23
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2074 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"d5d443d5b985c9879285c7a233b08341","decided_at":"2026-10-17T03:58:21.466Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.1111,"findings_hash":"HGw2Dp2QCd4yR1mGJzBJyaNGBkaUgym7VC3rzWoLwmeT","investigation_id":"906525a5-b86d-4d1f-bfd6-a3c27a894f5d","mode":"findings_only","new_score":34,"page_content_hash":"7abc0ce0c808616ef6cd8a4281214b2db65ad65c59f4c938815d65e65ab72532","page_slug":"taiko-bridge-sgx-key-exploit-june-2026","prev_score":34,"reason":"The page's central narrative -- an RSA-3072 SGX enclave key accidentally committed to the public taikoxyz/raiko GitHub repo, used to register a rogue prover and forge ~$1.7M in withdrawal proofs, followed by a rapid freeze and a July 2 reopening with full restitution -- is strongly corroborated across DARKNAVY's on-chain forensics, CoinDesk, crypto.news, CryptoBriefing, Chainalysis, QuillAudits, Incrypted and other independent outlets I fetched directly. Specific technical details (contract addresses, attacker wallet, instance IDs, block numbers, drained-token amounts, PR #21820 metrics, restart-plan dates) check out precisely against primary sources. Two issues stood out: a timeline entry dates the checkpoint-submission/processMessage/fund-release sequence to June 22, 2026, when the DARKNAVY source it draws those exact mechanics from timestamps the same actions to June 21; and the stated $0.07294 all-time-low figure was superseded days later by a lower, independently tracked all-time low (~$0.057 on June 26). A claim attributing an 'operational key-management error' framing to the Ledger CTO specifically overstates his more architectural comments. The broader 2026 bridge-exploit context (Kelp DAO, Gravity Bridge, PeckShield's cumulative figures) is accurate. No manipulative instructions were found embedded in the two accepted submissions, which are duplicate citations of already-used sources and support their labeled valence.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":6,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}