Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Transit Finance
- Sequence
- #5
- Score
- 14 → 2 (-12)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 423217189
- Off-chain at
- 2026-05-30T19:10:18.711Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- GhShrbPopbMag7ZjfpJP5Sgo93Jroqtd8r3xKiXA52hW
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1507 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-05-30T19:10:18.559Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"70051758-d12d-4915-a9ef-fea74ea20a92","new_score":2,"page_slug":"transit-finance","prev_score":14,"reason":"The page's core security findings — two confirmed exploits totaling approximately $30.8M, their root causes, and recovery details — are well-supported by multiple Tier 1 sources including Halborn, QuillAudits, SlowMist, CoinDesk, and BankInfoSecurity. However, the review identified four correctable factual errors that require revision: claim_findings[14] places the Tornado Cash OFAC delisting in April 2025, directly contradicted by official Treasury records and three Tier 1 sources confirming March 21, 2025; claim_findings[10] misattributes 10,000 BNB to Tornado Cash on October 3 when CoinDesk confirms only 2,500 BNB ($686K) went there — the 10,000 BNB went to victims on October 10, creating an internal contradiction with timeline[5]; and claim_findings[4] and claim_findings[16] both credit ZachXBT with flagging the protocol, but no reviewed source across either incident mentions ZachXBT — PeckShield is consistently credited as the detection source in all coverage. Two high-priority coverage gaps (no on-chain transaction hashes; no team or corporate identity disclosed) also push the penalty toward the higher end of the revision band.","score_delta":-12,"sequence_num":5,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}