Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review · Balancer
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 32 → 32 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 426514943
- Off-chain at
- 2026-06-14T23:16:23.077Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- AF9BbupBDjv4dLPmziLmBHZsJXxD6CSgFiTJzZMRaXxj
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1988 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-06-14T23:16:23.008Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"36f75834-67ae-4c11-b2be-78c9066f6778","new_score":32,"page_slug":"balancer","prev_score":32,"reason":"Blue-chip calibration review (Prompt A). Verdict: over-penalized. Page content is treated as accurate; the trust_score band is miscalibrated. Balancer is a legitimate, long-running DeFi AMM protocol that has been repeatedly victimized by external attackers, not a fraudulent or deceptive entity. The current score of 32 places it in the lower WARNING band alongside entities with actual fraud risk, which constitutes an over-penalty. Every incident on the page was perpetrated by outside attackers exploiting smart contract arithmetic vulnerabilities, cross-protocol exposure from a third-party collapse (Euler Finance), or an infrastructure hijack against a DNS registrar — none constitute insider fraud or concealed negligence. The page also incorrectly attributes the Velocore fork exploit ($6.8M) to Balancer directly, inflating cumulative losses, and the Euler Finance contagion loss is collateral damage rather than a Balancer contract flaw. Adjusting for these misattributions, direct Balancer losses total approximately $131M across five incidents. The November 2025 $128M exploit remains severe and partially unresolved (partial recovery of $19-55M documented), and Balancer Labs shut down as corporate entity in March 2026 — both warrant staying in WARNING band. A score of 42 correctly reflects a legitimate protocol with severe, recurring external security incidents while not treating it as a fraudulent entity; the Velocore, Euler, and DNS modifier penalties should be removed or substantially reduced. The page's omission of Balancer V3's unaffected status and clean audit is a material gap that further skews the risk portrayal.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}