Skip to main content
Sign in
← avoid.net

Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review · Balancer
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#4
Score
3232 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
426514943
Off-chain at
2026-06-14T23:16:23.077Z
Anchored at
Block time

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
AF9BbupBDjv4dLPmziLmBHZsJXxD6CSgFiTJzZMRaXxj
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1988 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-06-14T23:16:23.008Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"36f75834-67ae-4c11-b2be-78c9066f6778","new_score":32,"page_slug":"balancer","prev_score":32,"reason":"Blue-chip calibration review (Prompt A). Verdict: over-penalized. Page content is treated as accurate; the trust_score band is miscalibrated. Balancer is a legitimate, long-running DeFi AMM protocol that has been repeatedly victimized by external attackers, not a fraudulent or deceptive entity. The current score of 32 places it in the lower WARNING band alongside entities with actual fraud risk, which constitutes an over-penalty. Every incident on the page was perpetrated by outside attackers exploiting smart contract arithmetic vulnerabilities, cross-protocol exposure from a third-party collapse (Euler Finance), or an infrastructure hijack against a DNS registrar — none constitute insider fraud or concealed negligence. The page also incorrectly attributes the Velocore fork exploit ($6.8M) to Balancer directly, inflating cumulative losses, and the Euler Finance contagion loss is collateral damage rather than a Balancer contract flaw. Adjusting for these misattributions, direct Balancer losses total approximately $131M across five incidents. The November 2025 $128M exploit remains severe and partially unresolved (partial recovery of $19-55M documented), and Balancer Labs shut down as corporate entity in March 2026 — both warrant staying in WARNING band. A score of 42 correctly reflects a legitimate protocol with severe, recurring external security incidents while not treating it as a fraudulent entity; the Velocore, Euler, and DNS modifier penalties should be removed or substantially reduced. The page's omission of Balancer V3's unaffected status and clean audit is a material gap that further skews the risk portrayal.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}