Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Hundred Finance
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 50 → 50 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 465088647
- Off-chain at
- 2026-11-03T23:46:24.872Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-11-03T23:46:48.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-11-03T23:46:48.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 34Ar2s31DWS4qt9i2sZ2YDLEsVQsiMXjfUMjLr49GHUS
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1334 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"eb4453f0a93abef9d225d2314545d5c1","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-11-03T23:46:24.659Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.1667,"investigation_id":"af09701f-259c-4f20-9652-cbb81aeffcb5","judge_def_hash":"750934ecb48272224909b7430fab271676d391380fbc821acbe7ee7e4cac2fa3","new_score":50,"page_slug":"hundred-finance","prev_score":50,"reason":"One of six checked claims (claim_findings[0]) was disputed, about 17%, which falls in the minor-issues band. That claim gives a regulatory motive for the attacker avoiding Tornado Cash that the cited DL News article does not support. Two further claims were only partly supported: claim_findings[3] states victim distributions were paid when the source describes only intended compensation, and claim_findings[4] has a source-dependent March 2022 attack date. The core account (the two exploits, their loss figures and the August 2023 shutdown vote) was confirmed, no omissions were found, and the reviewer's confidence is moderate, so the penalty is kept at the lower end of the band.","reviewer_def_hash":"3839668b232611e5b26db72079d64745f8e57e919b8a379e79b44ba4a52c845b","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}