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AVOID.NET
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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#3
Score
00 (-12)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443519372
Off-chain at
2026-08-26T06:05:11.236Z
Anchored at
Block time

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
4ZTrFTT4HsWoiQ1unMZXRttwdJoHzzWGUoG26inVYNUH
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1774 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-26T06:05:10.882Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"e9d60bed-425b-4fc6-b70b-15d7d8e9722d","new_score":0,"page_slug":"lazarus-group-mach-o-man-macos-campaign-2026","prev_score":0,"reason":"Recomputing from the reviewer's own claim_findings array (24 entries, not the 25 stated in its summary) gives 19 confirmed, 2 partially supported, and 3 disputed claims, for a disputed rate of 12.5% under the spec's disputed+unverifiable formula. That places this page in the minor-issues revision band. The bulk of the page — the malware's four-stage architecture, file hashes, C2 infrastructure, delivery mechanism, and operator OPSEC failures (claim_findings[9]-[15]) — was checked directly against the primary vendor research and confirmed exactly, which is the core public-safety content of the page. Three claims are disputed: the page misdates Lazarus Group's original OFAC sanctions listing to April 2022 when its own separately cited 2019 Treasury release places it three years earlier (claim_findings[2]); it applies the 'TraderTraitor' sub-unit label to the Drift Protocol hack on the strength of its lowest-credibility source, where three Tier-1 outlets attribute that incident to Lazarus generally (claim_findings[16]); and it asserts as fact that the malware's architecture had already spread to other criminal groups via a named stealer, a claim its own cited source neither supports nor mentions (claim_findings[22]). None of these touch the technical evidence readers rely on for defense; they are attribution and dating errors concentrated in framing and context sections.","score_delta":-12,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}