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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review_revise · Growth DeFi
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#4
Score
50 → 50 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
464380339
Off-chain at
2026-11-02T05:37:46.447Z
Anchored at
2026-11-02T05:37:58.000Z
Block time
2026-11-02T05:37:58.000Z

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
J6ro89g7abwhmtnxCefebMi5TxGypZkyN7H5nk432spi
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2399 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"e5e77b5f6dd464e4c07d00bc5f5a7058","band_override":{"actual_delta":-30,"actual_verdict":"review_revise","disputed_pct":0.75,"expected_delta_range":[-50,-30],"expected_verdict":"review_deny","rationale":"Of the four claims the reviewer could check (two more were excluded because the sources blocked access), two were disputed and one had no support, which puts the page in the highest dispute band. The summary and timeline call the February 2021 exploit a 'flashloan price oracle' attack (claim_findings[0], [1]), but the page's own exploit section and the REKT account describe a fake-token validation flaw, which the review confirmed (claim_findings[2]). The ZachXBT section has no supporting source (claim_findings[5]), though the page itself admits this. Because the reviewer's confidence is low (0.4), the exploit itself is confirmed, and the errors are mislabeling rather than fabricated events, the penalty is softened from denial to a revision at the top of the significant band."},"blocked_count":2,"decided_at":"2026-11-02T05:37:46.230Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.75,"investigation_id":"34c018b1-ccde-499e-9f0d-f53bb4537f22","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":50,"page_slug":"growth-defi","prev_score":50,"reason":"Of the four claims the reviewer could check (two more were excluded because the sources blocked access), two were disputed and one had no support, which puts the page in the highest dispute band. The summary and timeline call the February 2021 exploit a 'flashloan price oracle' attack (claim_findings[0], [1]), but the page's own exploit section and the REKT account describe a fake-token validation flaw, which the review confirmed (claim_findings[2]). The ZachXBT section has no supporting source (claim_findings[5]), though the page itself admits this. Because the reviewer's confidence is low (0.4), the exploit itself is confirmed, and the errors are mislabeling rather than fabricated events, the penalty is softened from denial to a revision at the top of the significant band.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":4,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}