Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 0 → 0 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 457689887
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-16T15:36:39.573Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-16T15:36:59.693Z
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 9Ly2ko9vg8G2ef44WKKR6yNAgXgGDjxH9J4NUsdZDrx5
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2190 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"d7d87ad96bd21915de635a85ecd42825","decided_at":"2026-10-16T15:36:39.293Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.2083,"findings_hash":"AyPTZAakfQM8TnAcAUd6zfuamjnzRQ6sjK8NgVoC86qD","investigation_id":"42b8c959-a16c-40cc-8834-3f1d3c054da1","mode":"findings_only","new_score":0,"page_content_hash":"0eff1e7977ae39749cb0a8c2d73f3f849c5cb41eda6f20a8a361a9dfe3d7bc0f","page_slug":"apple-app-store-systematic-fake-crypto-wallet-cluster-26-apps-april-2026","prev_score":0,"reason":"The page's central claims about the Kaspersky FakeWallet disclosure (26 apps, seven impersonated wallets, April 20, 2026 report, SparkKitty attribution, technical attack chain) and about the concurrent Ledger Live Mac App Store theft ($9.5M, Leva Heal Limited, KuCoin/AudiA6 laundering, April 2026 dates) and the Sparrow Wallet lawsuit (plaintiffs, dates, loss figures, Craig Raw's prior warnings and the 'dishonest activity' account threat) are all independently verifiable against primary and reputable secondary sources and hold up well. Several concrete defects were found: SparkCat's public disclosure date is stated as January 2025 in two sections when the page's own cited source (The Hacker News) and Kaspersky's primary blog post both say February 2025; a timeline entry dates SparkKitty's Kaspersky disclosure to June 2024 when it was June 2025 (an internal one-year error, since the page's own prose elsewhere correctly says June 2025); and the Apple's Response section claims the Ledger Live app was removed 'approximately two weeks' after becoming active, which contradicts both the page's own earlier section (which correctly says roughly one week) and the underlying April 7-14 date range. One attribution detail ('Chinese-language logging messages embedded throughout the malware code') overstates the specificity of the evidence Kaspersky actually cites. The page's biggest substantive gap is the absence of any on-chain loss quantification for the FakeWallet cluster itself, the incident the page is nominally about.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}