Skip to main content
AVOID.NET
← avoid.net

Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#2
Score
28 → 28 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
462279510
Off-chain at
2026-10-28T00:48:46.321Z
Anchored at
2026-10-28T00:49:54.000Z
Block time
2026-10-28T00:49:54.000Z

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
6e4eDGtdkdFbQBGpob6TAg9AJgsgY21QAM8Ee9C2HLWs
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1367 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"3247fe93ae411930fb7583e2ff50b430","decided_at":"2026-10-28T00:48:46.247Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0,"findings_hash":"FiCvPZJEcQR9MzKoygPYTH5X9pWvgR57hRp2JhHD2AE9","investigation_id":"80319ae0-ff55-4387-b566-3306a009cfb4","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":28,"omissions":{"material":3,"total":4},"page_content_hash":"074d0dc7265e32217f0b7b0f14f26f4dbc59db2eaca36f95c574172252000cfd","page_slug":"near-intents-omni-exploit-october-2026","prev_score":28,"reason":"The incident facts as of October 1-2 (amount, 11-network pause, reimbursement pledge, ZachXBT tracing, Bitget context) match Decrypt and Cointelegraph. The page is now out of date. An October 16 post-mortem reportedly gives a different root cause (the contract's deposit notification function), says the attacker returned the funds, and says users were compensated. The page states no post-mortem exists and does not mention these developments. The 12-hour restoration claim rests on a forecast.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"subject_status":"operating","subject_status_contradicts_page":true,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}