Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · SingularityNET (AGIX/WMTx Bridge Key Compromise)
- Sequence
- #6
- Score
- 7 → 4 (-3)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 465259413
- Off-chain at
- 2026-11-04T09:56:04.399Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-11-04T09:56:16.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-11-04T09:56:16.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- Ha4EkRaqnMuRmpPyj1b5By5wsaFV83DC6mNbUDDHhmRh
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1942 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"3487e110cd95edf8fda4d66077406044","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-11-04T09:56:04.108Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0,"investigation_id":"c619740c-0607-41e0-b5da-c19ca0f81524","judge_def_hash":"750934ecb48272224909b7430fab271676d391380fbc821acbe7ee7e4cac2fa3","new_score":4,"page_slug":"singularitynet-agix-wmtx-bridge-key-compromise","prev_score":7,"reason":"All 10 claim findings were confirmed or partially supported, with none disputed or unverifiable, so the claim error rate is 0%. The page understates what its own source says about key rotation (claim_findings[2], omission_findings[0]): CryptoSlate reports the compromised credentials were still not rotated about five hours after the attack. Two smaller attribution problems also need fixing: the Bitvavo suspension is credited to ForkLog but appears in CryptoSlate (claim_findings[7]), and the ForkLog publication date is unchecked (claim_findings[8]). A high-priority gap remains for primary statements from the affected projects. The page covers the exploit and does not contradict the subject's status, so a small penalty and a minor-issues flag apply.","replaces_fact_checks":{"score_before_fact_checks":12,"undone":2},"reviewer_def_hash":"3839668b232611e5b26db72079d64745f8e57e919b8a379e79b44ba4a52c845b","score_delta":-3,"sequence_num":6,"severity_override":{"applied":true,"band":"minor","from_band":"approve","reason":"omission_findings[0] is rated material: CryptoSlate reports the compromised bridge authorizer and NuNet minter credentials were not rotated or revoked about five hours after the attack, and the page only says rotation is unconfirmed. A high-priority coverage gap (primary statements) points the same way. The claim-level percentage alone (0%) understates this."},"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}