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AVOID.NET
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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#6
Score
7 → 4 (-3)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
465259413
Off-chain at
2026-11-04T09:56:04.399Z
Anchored at
2026-11-04T09:56:16.000Z
Block time
2026-11-04T09:56:16.000Z

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
Ha4EkRaqnMuRmpPyj1b5By5wsaFV83DC6mNbUDDHhmRh
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1942 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"3487e110cd95edf8fda4d66077406044","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-11-04T09:56:04.108Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0,"investigation_id":"c619740c-0607-41e0-b5da-c19ca0f81524","judge_def_hash":"750934ecb48272224909b7430fab271676d391380fbc821acbe7ee7e4cac2fa3","new_score":4,"page_slug":"singularitynet-agix-wmtx-bridge-key-compromise","prev_score":7,"reason":"All 10 claim findings were confirmed or partially supported, with none disputed or unverifiable, so the claim error rate is 0%. The page understates what its own source says about key rotation (claim_findings[2], omission_findings[0]): CryptoSlate reports the compromised credentials were still not rotated about five hours after the attack. Two smaller attribution problems also need fixing: the Bitvavo suspension is credited to ForkLog but appears in CryptoSlate (claim_findings[7]), and the ForkLog publication date is unchecked (claim_findings[8]). A high-priority gap remains for primary statements from the affected projects. The page covers the exploit and does not contradict the subject's status, so a small penalty and a minor-issues flag apply.","replaces_fact_checks":{"score_before_fact_checks":12,"undone":2},"reviewer_def_hash":"3839668b232611e5b26db72079d64745f8e57e919b8a379e79b44ba4a52c845b","score_delta":-3,"sequence_num":6,"severity_override":{"applied":true,"band":"minor","from_band":"approve","reason":"omission_findings[0] is rated material: CryptoSlate reports the compromised bridge authorizer and NuNet minter credentials were not rotated or revoked about five hours after the attack, and the page only says rotation is unconfirmed. A high-priority coverage gap (primary statements) points the same way. The claim-level percentage alone (0%) understates this."},"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}