Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Triple-A Treasury Hack (July 2026)
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 28 → 22 (-6)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443512981
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-25T08:35:24.798Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 8FLzd7SVLysn1FqVmUP4uRVpCpYfoTaauQLqW5pD7kGs
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1731 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-25T08:35:24.666Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"25b13922-977d-4211-a52e-e95f7d52bd0f","new_score":22,"page_slug":"triple-a-treasury-hack-july-2026","prev_score":28,"reason":"The fact-check found no disputed or unverifiable claims out of 26 checked (disputed_pct = 0%), and the page's core facts -- the ~$11.8M loss, 31-hour drain window, seven affected chains, hot-wallet root cause, client-fund segregation, and Triple-A's solvency statement -- are consistently corroborated, including a verbatim-verified quote (claim_findings[4]) and a clean event-date check with no title/event mismatch. Five claims were only partially supported: an ETH-amount figure (5,287) stated as settled in the summary despite the page's own bundled sources reporting 5,227-5,287 (claim_findings[3] and [9]), a 'first digital-currency payment company' superlative that traces mainly to the company's own self-description (claim_findings[5]), and a regulatory detail that is accurate but not backed by the specific sources cited for that section (claim_findings[14]). None of these amount to a factual error, but together with a high-priority coverage gap -- an August 6, 2026 report that roughly $5M tied to the attacker's wallet moved through Tornado Cash, which postdates the page's newest sources and is not yet reflected (coverage_gaps[0]) -- the page needs a light update rather than a clean pass. The gap reflects the incident continuing to develop after publication rather than an error made at the time of writing, which keeps the penalty modest.","score_delta":-6,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}