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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#3
Score
2822 (-6)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443512981
Off-chain at
2026-08-25T08:35:24.798Z
Anchored at
Block time

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
8FLzd7SVLysn1FqVmUP4uRVpCpYfoTaauQLqW5pD7kGs
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1731 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-25T08:35:24.666Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"25b13922-977d-4211-a52e-e95f7d52bd0f","new_score":22,"page_slug":"triple-a-treasury-hack-july-2026","prev_score":28,"reason":"The fact-check found no disputed or unverifiable claims out of 26 checked (disputed_pct = 0%), and the page's core facts -- the ~$11.8M loss, 31-hour drain window, seven affected chains, hot-wallet root cause, client-fund segregation, and Triple-A's solvency statement -- are consistently corroborated, including a verbatim-verified quote (claim_findings[4]) and a clean event-date check with no title/event mismatch. Five claims were only partially supported: an ETH-amount figure (5,287) stated as settled in the summary despite the page's own bundled sources reporting 5,227-5,287 (claim_findings[3] and [9]), a 'first digital-currency payment company' superlative that traces mainly to the company's own self-description (claim_findings[5]), and a regulatory detail that is accurate but not backed by the specific sources cited for that section (claim_findings[14]). None of these amount to a factual error, but together with a high-priority coverage gap -- an August 6, 2026 report that roughly $5M tied to the attacker's wallet moved through Tornado Cash, which postdates the page's newest sources and is not yet reflected (coverage_gaps[0]) -- the page needs a light update rather than a clean pass. The gap reflects the incident continuing to develop after publication rather than an error made at the time of writing, which keeps the penalty modest.","score_delta":-6,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}