Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review · Bedrock Protocol
- Sequence
- #2
- Score
- 48 → 48 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 425182125
- Off-chain at
- 2026-06-08T20:21:44.692Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- AdzsK1LHHkr2kdPV5zkSWafL9jKUUci6LEEPqqByEQbT
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1187 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-06-08T20:21:44.520Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"115a5a12-8658-46ed-a28a-82a146c39d24","new_score":48,"page_slug":"bedrock-protocol","prev_score":48,"reason":"The investigation is substantively accurate. The core facts of the September 2024 exploit — date, attacker address, amount, vulnerability mechanism, Dedaub disclosure timeline, and Bedrock response — are confirmed by multiple independent security research sources. The principal inaccuracy is the $75 million market cap figure, which conflates the uniBTC Ethereum vault exposure with the full protocol TVL (which was approximately $229-240 million at exploit time). Two link-rot issues were identified: the primary CoinTelegraph job-offer URL (404) and the ffnews.com launch article (failed to load). The Fuzzland insider-threat section is appropriately hedged as unconfirmed allegations. Material coverage gaps exist around multi-chain exploit scope, user reimbursement confirmation, and independent verification of legal proceedings.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}