Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Mass Ethereum Address-Poisoning Wave (Dec 2025-Jan 2026)
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 0 → 0 (-8)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 425237660
- Off-chain at
- 2026-06-09T02:30:47.477Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 25VV8MgvyjWGJ1PQ4THeLA3T18jRdBMu9RqySsp4oira
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1401 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-06-09T02:30:47.195Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"d26f0717-a271-4777-9588-a38b07075085","new_score":0,"page_slug":"mass-ethereum-address-poisoning-wave-dec-2025-jan-2026","prev_score":0,"reason":"The investigation is broadly accurate and well-sourced across its major claims — the $50M and $12.25M victim losses, Fusaka activation details, CMU study figures, and post-Fusaka surge statistics are all confirmed by Tier 1 and Tier 2 sources. However, claim_findings[17] (stale) identifies a material factual error in the 'On-Chain Forensics' section: the page states the attacker's December 2025 Tornado Cash use 'constitutes alleged violations of U.S. Treasury sanctions regulations,' but OFAC officially delisted Tornado Cash on March 21, 2025 — nine months before the incident occurred. This is a high-priority finding in a critical-severity section that requires correction before the page accurately represents the legal context. Additionally, claim_findings[1] and claim_findings[11] identify that the 67% gas fee reduction figure and specific per-dust-transfer cost values ($2.00 to $0.10–$0.15) are supported only by a single Tier 3 blog post and are not independently confirmed by primary sources.","score_delta":-8,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}