Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
- Sequence
- #2
- Score
- 62 → 62 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443516794
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-25T19:38:45.096Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- Cx1ZAnFUrPryVaFYrJ3TApCZXQWX7scxXNuhhftyt2Sh
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1183 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-25T19:38:45.002Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"78b38f72-39bb-4310-8c4f-1c0987620b7a","new_score":62,"page_slug":"btcpay-server-lightning-lnd-macaroon-exploit-august-2026","prev_score":62,"reason":"The page correctly and consistently attributes the flaw to BTCPay Server's own application layer (not to LND/Lightning Labs or the Lightning protocol), and its central claim -- that this was an actively exploited, unauthenticated remote flaw rather than a merely disclosed one -- is well-supported by BTCPay's own advisory and consistent secondary reporting on the Foundation and Citadel21 incidents. However, the page fabricates a 'root cause' by conflating a separate, previously-patched TOTP/FIDO2 authentication bug with the still-undisclosed mechanism of the actual macaroon-theft exploit, and it twice asserts that BTCPay-generated on-chain hot wallets were at risk and required migration, which directly contradicts the advisory it cites, which states those wallets were not affected.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}