Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 0 → 0 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 457928126
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-17T05:56:17.948Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-17T05:56:26.670Z
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- FZTtgsFpsnRYkrTFXmzEMxmAVWrtnrDSP5htrnVKHefn
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1920 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"a6e2825338b492f852b8586cfb4fa5f5","decided_at":"2026-10-17T05:56:17.768Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.3478,"findings_hash":"4rA3mToXuJqDE8qXU6U32yrquxSZWVZ2Qx4HZDoFkfGn","investigation_id":"491937e2-0e11-4c61-ac86-db98727d3bab","mode":"findings_only","new_score":0,"page_content_hash":"6f8550fc218786a2d6261e41e53519ea47c958a4761492d279638fff3952ca3c","page_slug":"crypto-com-phishing-campaign-email-domain-abuse-august-2026","prev_score":0,"reason":"The page's central technical narrative — SendGrid click-tracking abuse producing an email that passes SPF/DKIM/DMARC and redirects via url1137.crypto.com to a Google Sites phishing page — is faithfully and accurately drawn from its primary source (the Dark Marc Substack post), and the broader industry-context statistics from Chainalysis, the FBI IC3, and CryptoDailyUK are mostly confirmed against the original reports. However, two factual errors were found: the CoinTracking SendGrid precedent is misdated by one year (November 2024 instead of November 2025, in both the timeline and body text), and the Chainalysis average-payment increase is misstated as 'more than 600%' when the source's own figures ($782 to $2,764) work out to about 253%. One claim (the real-time OTP relay to Crypto.com's real login endpoint) states as fact a mechanism the source explicitly says it could not confirm. The Crypto.com warning date (July 30 vs. July 31) and a quoted commenter's remark could not be independently verified and conflict with another source used elsewhere on the page. The whole incident narrative rests on a single Substack author and one low-tier aggregator, with no independent corroboration, on-chain evidence, or statement from Crypto.com specific to this campaign.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}