Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Matcha
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 72 → 62 (-10)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 424133140
- Off-chain at
- 2026-06-04T00:14:54.448Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- FS3Ep3zjgni42Wwq5XQs8nCHqLjRNWp4TCRebuxnRA5N
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1319 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-06-04T00:14:53.823Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"1b600779-6561-4201-8014-61c0c7125aa1","new_score":62,"page_slug":"matcha","prev_score":72,"reason":"The reviewer confirmed 17 of 22 claims outright, with 3 partially supported and 1 disputed, yielding an 18% non-confirmed rate that falls in the minor-issues band. The single disputed claim (claim_findings[11]) is a date error: the page lists 0x Protocol v1 mainnet launch as 2018 but three sources — including a co-founder post — place it in August 2017. Two partially supported claims (claim_findings[19] and claim_findings[20]) reflect further date inaccuracies: the Matcha Solana launch is off by approximately three months, and the SwapNet exploit date is off by one day. No disputed claims touch the core risk or security posture of the entity. A high-priority coverage gap (claim_findings[20] notes area; coverage_gaps[2]) — the absence of any information on user compensation or restitution after the $13.4M SwapNet exploit — should be addressed before the page is considered complete. Auditor name spelling (Ouroboros vs. Ourovoros) is also noted for correction.","score_delta":-10,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}