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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review · Clober Liquidity Vault
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#4
Score
52 → 52 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443512461
Off-chain at
2026-08-25T07:43:04.430Z
Anchored at
—
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
HCry5b1JACvztJqK9tTUchtUVqyfCLCk6MZogyyghVQ6
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1298 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-25T07:43:04.209Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"1a79704b-57a7-48c8-a46e-fc27bd4c6d12","new_score":52,"page_slug":"clober-liquidity-vault","prev_score":52,"reason":"The page's core narrative — a December 10, 2024 reentrancy exploit draining ~133.7 ETH (~$501,000) from the newly launched Clober Liquidity Vault via a post-audit code change in the _burn() function, with a declined 20% white-hat bounty and unrecovered funds — is well-corroborated across CertiK, Rekt News, SolidityScan, PeckShield, BaseScan, and DefiLlama's live API. The main issues found are secondary: one section misattributes the 'post-audit code addition' conclusion to CertiK and QuillAudits when neither article actually makes that claim, several citations (Nominis, Cryptopolitan, Mitrade) are used for specific sub-facts (bounty decline, non-prosecution) that those particular articles do not contain even though the facts are true and sourced elsewhere on the page, and one operational-status claim about 'modest' TVL is accurate for its stated 'early 2026' window but is now outdated relative to substantially higher live TVL.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}