Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review · Taiko Ethereum L2 Bridge
- Sequence
- #2
- Score
- 18 → 18 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443506739
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-10T18:40:26.287Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- E84pwH16F2R3a9ChbyxaiRyTDpJyEDmLoGKttFV3jr68
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1202 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-10T18:40:26.191Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"e7571a21-62a4-49e5-af98-83b7f5b14098","new_score":18,"page_slug":"taiko-ethereum-l2-bridge","prev_score":18,"reason":"The page's core factual claims about the June 22, 2026 Taiko bridge exploit — loss amount, contract addresses, root cause (leaked SGX signing key), attack mechanics, detection timeline, and market impact — are well corroborated by multiple independent tier-1/tier-2 sources. The most significant issue is that the Recovery Plan and parts of the Market Impact sections are stale: the bridge was fully reopened on July 2, 2026 with all users made whole, a fact omitted despite postdating several of the page's own cited source archive timestamps. The Ledger CTO characterization is also a mild mischaracterization of the cited source, which framed the incident as both an operational and an architectural/design problem. The page substantially overlaps with a separate corpus entry, taiko-ethereum-l2-bridge-exploit, covering the same incident.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}