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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review_revise · debank.auction
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#3
Score
2 → 0 (-12)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443514672
Off-chain at
2026-08-25T13:41:22.703Z
Anchored at
—
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
5goxQQq73kVPzUGjNJAxpWhKbc2p6DW49MoVhv68mYRs
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1751 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-25T13:41:22.070Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"027efe27-8bb6-4acc-8596-12b3ac306d6a","new_score":0,"page_slug":"debank-auction","prev_score":2,"reason":"An independent fact-check disputed or could not verify 9 of 36 claims on this page (25%), but none of those items touch the page's central allegation — that debank.auction is a malicious typosquatting domain using hidden, AI-targeted prompt injection — which remains fully confirmed against the primary Zscaler research (claim_findings[12], [13], [16], [17], [20]). Instead, the disputed claims cluster around a recurring sourcing problem: a Hacker News article cited as coverage of this campaign that actually predates it and covers an unrelated topic (claim_findings[27], [31]), a Group-IB source cited to support a DeBank-specific claim it never makes (claim_findings[24]), and an 'updated August 5' date that appears to conflate an archive snapshot with an actual editorial revision (claim_findings[22], [35]), which also leaves a related claim unverifiable (claim_findings[29]). One minor background fact — DeBank supporting '100+' chains versus independently reported '~70+' — is also disputed (claim_findings[4]). These are citation-hygiene failures layered on top of solid core reporting, not evidence the underlying threat account is wrong. Combined with two high-priority coverage gaps (independent verification of the domain's current status, and re-verification of the mismatched citations), this warrants a moderate score reduction and a revision cycle rather than approval or denial.","score_delta":-12,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}