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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review_revise · SingularityNET
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#4
Score
26 → 26 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
462184708
Off-chain at
2026-10-27T19:12:33.931Z
Anchored at
2026-10-27T19:13:06.000Z
Block time
2026-10-27T19:13:06.000Z

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
8nSKvKEMGqVGfbZ1uCRiUVSTnW4DDz9ABZ6oK1p8vzTS
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1772 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"88c71bb3196a597178377c320c2a3917","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-10-27T19:12:33.637Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.25,"investigation_id":"f8c9cadf-e1e8-4696-b4d2-3f487a0ef174","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":26,"page_slug":"singularitynet","prev_score":26,"reason":"Two of eight checked claims (25%) could not be found in the cited sources: the exact 20:21 UTC first-transaction time (claim_findings[0]) and the 'ninth major bridge exploit / $345 million' figure (claim_findings[3]). Three more are only partly supported: the Bitquery '48 hours' wording (claim_findings[2]), the $2.25M 'through token sales' wording (claim_findings[6]) and the NTX figure, which the cited source rounds (claim_findings[4]). One archive link points to an unrelated article (claim_findings[7]). The core incident account is consistent with the sources checked, but the page has no update after September 21 and lacks primary-source citations, so it needs revision and a modest score reduction.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"severity_override":{"applied":false,"band":null,"from_band":"minor","reason":"The material omission is that the page has no update after 2026-09-21. The review found no shutdown, sanction or contradiction (subject_status.contradicts_page is false) and the page already describes the exploit. The gap is covered by the revise verdict and the high-priority post-incident coverage gap, so the percentage band is kept."},"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}