Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 28 → 28 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 457753129
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-16T19:25:17.146Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-16T19:25:33.381Z
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- JCzwq3HCLryhXCa5jik1nj3cZ1h2HapQFAN2W67ZKEz3
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2291 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"1c38449a5b6f5021b8d0fad2c9920d56","decided_at":"2026-10-16T19:25:16.966Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.1111,"findings_hash":"3DTWvh5FAX1He5m511ee3Z41faFrNCfPay5Kg6DpZapL","investigation_id":"3758620e-d099-427e-aa60-da826e35cd86","mode":"findings_only","new_score":28,"page_content_hash":"14361206ece2a507ede31fd37534185901956f0ab9f4f09f43de1cb3c94998b7","page_slug":"stablr-multisig-exploit-and-eurr-usdr-depeg","prev_score":28,"reason":"The page's core narrative — a compromised signer on a 1-of-3 Ethereum minting multisig at StablR, used to mint roughly 8.35M USDR and 4.5M EURR (~$13.5M unbacked), realizing ~$2.8M (1,115 ETH) in net proceeds, followed by a depeg, suspension of minting/redemption, and an unresolved reserve deficit as of late July 2026 — holds up well under independent verification. Both ownership-modification transaction hashes, the compromised signer address, two of three malicious addresses, and the USDR/EURR contract addresses were independently confirmed on Etherscan and match the page precisely, which is unusually strong technical corroboration for a submitted investigation. StablR's own official statements corroborate the incident date, the 'deliberate precaution' suspension language, the Recovery Plan activation, and the MiCA backing shortfall. EFRI's governance allegations and the regulatory/MiCA analysis are accurately represented and appropriately hedged. Two clear errors were found: an incorrect EUR/USD reference rate ($1.08 instead of the actual ~$1.15-1.18) used to characterize EURR's depeg severity, and an overstated claim that 'no centralized freeze mechanism was available to recover the proceeds,' when multiple outlets report an on-chain investigator helped freeze a six-figure portion of stolen funds. The summary's description of StablR as 'backed by Tether' is also inconsistent with the more accurate 'strategic investment' framing used elsewhere on the same page. The page would also benefit from acknowledging the $2.8M-vs-$10M loss-estimate disagreement among analysts and from an update reflecting any developments after July 22, 2026.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}