Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 0 → 0 (-6)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443518099
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-25T22:49:25.348Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- C3BpoMWM7WQ4RpsYkUgiXcVtVfKGJhWNA7u83UfqcJsH
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2188 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-25T22:49:25.087Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"a531e342-f813-4cf2-ad17-392497d9e60f","new_score":0,"page_slug":"mica-post-deadline-impersonation-scam-cluster-esma-amf-warning-august-2026","prev_score":0,"reason":"The reviewer confirmed 23 of 26 claims outright, with zero disputed or unverifiable claims and no link rot on any citation; the page's core narrative — the MiCA transitional-period expiry, ESMA's and AMF's confirmed impersonation cases, and Belgium's FSMA blacklist of six named unauthorized entities — is well corroborated by primary regulatory sources. However, the disputed-claim count does not capture two accuracy problems worth correcting. First, claim_findings[9] shows the page's top-level summary states that ESMA, France's AMF, the Dutch AFM, and Belgium's FSMA jointly 'documented a significant surge in impersonation scams,' when only ESMA and AMF are actually documented as having been impersonated; AFM issued a general caution and FSMA's action targeted unauthorized providers, not impersonation of FSMA itself. Notably, the page's own Attribution section already draws this distinction correctly — only the summary overstates it. Second, claim_findings[10] found no source naming Coinbase, Kraken, or OKX as impersonation targets; the underlying reporting names them only as examples of licensed, MiCA-authorized exchanges. Stating specific real companies were targeted, without a source, is a sourcing lapse on a platform whose core value proposition is sourced evidence, even though the framing itself does not accuse them of wrongdoing. A third partially-supported item (claim_findings[17], an unverified 2020 loss-figure comparison) is minor and does not affect the page's core claims. None of this rises to a disputed core allegation, and reviewer confidence was reasonably high (0.82) with no critical citation showing link rot or staleness, so the issues call for a correction pass rather than a significant-issues label or investigation status change.","score_delta":-6,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}