Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 5 → 0 (-13)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443522069
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-26T20:06:05.184Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 3h9o3c9FkXhdVSxedADKTaw6MFwQu6N9S5neGjUe62rV
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2109 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-26T20:06:04.583Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"02dd591c-879c-4f2f-b0a7-2f84a0be2243","new_score":0,"page_slug":"interpol-operation-first-light-2026-123m-romance-scam-crypto-network","prev_score":5,"reason":"The disputed rate lands at 17.9% (5 of 28 claims disputed or unverifiable), squarely in the review_revise band. The page's core Operation First Light 2026 statistics — arrest count, dollar figures, victim counts, case metrics, and the headline Thailand $122.5M wallet case — are confirmed directly against INTERPOL's own press release (claim_findings[0], [1], [2], [6]), and the page correctly avoids merging the 2024 and 2026 editions' figures (claim_findings[27]). However, the page's parallel-operation section on Red Card 2.0 contains a load-bearing attribution error: it credits Binance and AFRIPOL with the operation, but INTERPOL's own release and the page's own cited tier-1 source (The Hacker News) name neither, instead identifying TRM Labs, Trend Micro, Team Cymru, Cybercrime Atlas, and Uppsala Security as technical partners and the UK FCDO/GLACY-e as funder (claim_findings[16]). This misattribution runs through the section heading and two timeline entries, not just a single sentence. The same section also lists South Africa among Red Card 2.0's 16 participating countries, contradicting both INTERPOL's own list and the page's own cited source (claim_findings[17]), and asserts that Cryptopolitan conflated the two operations when neither Cryptopolitan article the page cites actually does so (claim_findings[20]). A true statistic (Thailand's ~800 daily fraud complaints) is also unsupported by any of the five sources cited for that section, though independently corroborated elsewhere (claim_findings[9]). These issues cluster mainly around one sub-section rather than the page's central claims, which is why the penalty stays in the moderate range rather than escalating further.","score_delta":-13,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}