Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
- Sequence
- #2
- Score
- 0 → 0 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443521704
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-26T17:05:34.042Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- Hhb9Wi5Dx1JSFTx2GfHDXgQsxgBwyd5GuqrVrjYk4nue
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1279 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-26T17:05:33.860Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"560492dd-7a63-4ab3-8a6a-0176a9cef7f2","new_score":0,"page_slug":"poland-sim-swap-crypto-theft-ring-june-july-2026","prev_score":0,"reason":"The page's core factual scaffolding — the June 25, 2026 CBZC arrest of four suspects with FBI/HSI support, the Kraków Regional Prosecutor's Office's supervisory role, the charges (organized crime, hacking, money laundering) and their pre-conviction procedural stage, the telecom-adjacent-vendor attack mechanism, and the disputed $5M–$15M loss estimate — is confirmed directly against Poland's own CBZC press release and corroborated by multiple independent Polish and international outlets. The ZachXBT identification of Wojtek Kulisz ('Merry') is accurately reported and consistently hedged as unconfirmed by authorities, though the ancillary claim that 'Merry' has documented prior SIM-swap history could not be substantiated, and a handful of interpretive claims (US-victim inference, extradition speculation, internal AVOID database cross-reference) are unverifiable rather than sourced fact.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}