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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review_revise · Atomic Wallet Hack
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#3
Score
10 → 0 (-13)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443512932
Off-chain at
2026-08-25T08:26:44.504Z
Anchored at
—
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
J8r6RBgq9YPCppgXZfJkJ6eHAZstFTGgWdonSToZ4ZTy
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2060 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-25T08:26:44.320Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"a746da55-5f10-4d44-931c-b05b2931a804","new_score":0,"page_slug":"atomic-wallet-hack","prev_score":10,"reason":"The reviewer confirmed 28 of 37 claims, including direct quotations, dollar figures, and North Korea attribution language, with only 1 of 37 (2.7%) actually disputed. Using the spec's disputed+unverifiable formula, the page's disputed_pct is 10.8%, just inside the band that calls for revision rather than approval or denial. The page's litigation section is out of date: claim_findings[31] found the statement that 'no subsequent litigation had been publicly reported in a U.S. court' is stale, since a new class action in the Northern District of California has been publicly reported since mid-2025 with an amended complaint filed in November 2025. That same section also omits a third named individual defendant, Ilia Brusov (claim_findings[29]). Two smaller sourcing errors compound the litigation section's problems: a timeline entry cites the wrong Treasury press release for the Garantex sanction (claim_findings[35]) and another timeline entry gives an incorrect filing date for the original lawsuit (claim_findings[36]). Elsewhere, a loss statistic is mischaracterized as a median when the source reports it as an average (claim_findings[15]), and a wallet-count figure is stated as a single number without disclosing a real spread across sources (claim_findings[1]). None of these touch the page's core allegations -- the hack, the loss scale, or the North Korea attribution -- which held up under review, but the litigation-status error is a substantive currency problem that a reader relying on this page would be misled by, and it aligns with a high-priority coverage gap the reviewer separately flagged. That combination justifies revision even though the aggregate dispute rate is low.","score_delta":-13,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}