Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · FixedFloat
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 10 → 0 (-20)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 464261218
- Off-chain at
- 2026-11-01T22:32:27.506Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-11-01T22:32:34.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-11-01T22:32:34.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- DhFVWyXX64oCsZevjdHccREhxipJPNeggpQWzRnWkxkv
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1616 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"140bacab8ae98d98d5661e7321540c58","band_override":null,"blocked_count":1,"decided_at":"2026-11-01T22:32:27.259Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.4444,"investigation_id":"6ac80542-8508-4b75-aa70-eaabfed272e6","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":0,"page_slug":"fixedfloat","prev_score":10,"reason":"Of 10 claims checked, 1 could not be read because the source blocked the reviewer and is left out, leaving 9. Three were disputed and one could not be found in its cited source, so 4 of 9 (44%) fall in the significant-issues band. The disputed items are the eXch takedown dated 2024 instead of 30 April 2025 (claim_findings[0] and [1], one underlying error) and the two-month suspension placed after the February breach when it followed the April one (claim_findings[6]). The 'only privately to journalists' quote is not in the cited FixedFloat post (claim_findings[4]). The core facts hold: the February and April 2024 breach amounts, the eXch routing and the Time4VPS account were confirmed. The penalty is set in the middle of the band because the errors are mostly dates and attribution, and the reviewer's confidence is moderate (0.6). No omission or status contradiction was reported, but the page has no coverage after mid-2024.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":-20,"scored_claims":9,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}