Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · mySwap CL Protocol (Starknet)
- Sequence
- #5
- Score
- 46 → 46 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 464294568
- Off-chain at
- 2026-11-02T00:31:25.558Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-11-02T00:31:39.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-11-02T00:31:39.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- EDV756upjDP2ZShMK7nn35u1ZYonaG4GsQcgeN6JtbB8
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1610 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"0802781c6386b8866e004d717a5e6ad4","band_override":null,"blocked_count":2,"decided_at":"2026-11-02T00:31:25.311Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.375,"investigation_id":"b1298889-6efa-4cbd-abcb-e2dc2a533ebb","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":46,"page_slug":"myswap-cl-protocol-starknet","prev_score":46,"reason":"Of 8 countable claim checks (2 DefiLlama checks were blocked and are excluded), 1 was disputed and 2 could not be verified, giving 37.5%. The core exploit facts hold: the EVIL token mechanism, the stolen amounts, the 100,000+ positions and mySwap's June 20 confirmation were confirmed (claim_findings[0], [1], [5]). The Ekubo comparison is contradicted by its own source, which describes an EVM router exploit that did not affect Starknet (claim_findings[6]). The Railgun and bridging claim is stated as fact but rests on one hedged 'reportedly' report (claim_findings[4]), and the 7:15 AM UTC time appears in no source read (claim_findings[2]). The page also relies on two secondary news articles with no primary technical source (high-priority coverage gap). The penalty sits at the low end of the band because the disputed item is in a medium-severity context section and the central incident is well supported.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":8,"sequence_num":5,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}