Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review · Chainflip
- Sequence
- #5
- Score
- 53 → 53 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 462357835
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-28T05:27:26.806Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-28T05:27:48.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-10-28T05:27:48.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- DtbDqJLxSQzzCL6YHMeRztNqTai3wvDtP7SqcJpwybhd
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1958 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"ffe29d84b4bfc164172a47274b03ba7d","decided_at":"2026-10-28T05:27:26.617Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0,"findings_hash":"Dw4xzUPFjSMX8TuaBxW7QfPbhkRHRuk14ph6N27WKBiB","investigation_id":"48b42a99-3bbe-4bc7-8910-0d744aa21dc0","mode":"findings_only","new_score":53,"omissions":{"material":2,"total":2},"page_content_hash":"39d22f3657ca8ed8ad3cf3979f755c60a7acbb9e746bfd4407c5664a69ea0980","page_slug":"chainflip","prev_score":53,"reason":"The page's core narrative — the September 12, 2026 TRON USDT memo exploit, its ~736,442.17 USDT loss across six of eight attempts, the 115,654.41 USDT stuck swap, the network-wide pause, the TRON-excluded restart by September 16, and the balance-reset/on-chain-ledger recovery plan — is accurately and consistently supported by multiple independent outlets (crypto.news, CryptoSlate, Blockfence, CryptoTicker, CoinInsider, KuCoin News) and matches the official-documentation-sourced protocol architecture description. The one factual defect found is a stale cumulative-volume figure ($6 billion, dated to February 2026) presented as current as of the page's reporting window, when Chainflip's own later disclosures and DefiLlama both showed closer to $8 billion by mid-2026. More significant than any single disputed claim is what the page omits entirely: Chainflip's use as a laundering venue by the Lazarus Group in the February 2025 Bybit hack, and a contained August 2026 exploit attempt on its Ethereum cross-chain messaging — both of which are material to understanding Chainflip's risk profile and absent from a page that otherwise reads as a single-incident write-up.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":5,"subject_status":"operating","subject_status_contradicts_page":false,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}