Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_approve · Yearn Finance
- Sequence
- #5
- Score
- 20 → 58 (+38)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 426514227
- Off-chain at
- 2026-06-14T23:15:44.939Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- tooKNPGcAVwLEBmf7xnimHBNGiP9dfhbfXiEL3zyMsz
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1378 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-06-14T23:15:44.802Z","decision":"review_approve","investigation_id":"4d531127-e978-430c-8f36-6eac186ef860","new_score":58,"page_slug":"yearn-finance","prev_score":20,"reason":"This is a severity-calibration review, not a content dispute. All six claim_findings (indices 0-5) are marked 'supported' with 0% disputed claims and reviewer confidence of 0.85. The review establishes that the page's current score of 32 (stored as 20) is materially too harsh because three incidents on the timeline — the Cream Finance $130M hack (claim_findings[1]), the Alpha Homora/Iron Bank $37M exploit (claim_findings[2]), and the Iron Bank $32M bad-debt freeze (claim_findings[5]) — were misattributed to Yearn when Yearn was either a bystander, a recovery helper, or an indirect depositor-protectee. Confirmed Yearn-specific losses are approximately $33M, all from legacy deprecated contracts, with V2/V3 vaults unaffected (claim_findings[3]). There is no evidence of fraud, Ponzi mechanics, or regulatory conviction (claim_findings[4]). The page content is accurate and must remain published; only the trust-score band requires correction from WARNING to CAUTIONARY (score 58), warranting a positive delta of +38.","score_delta":38,"sequence_num":5,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}