Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Across Protocol Solana Bridge Exploit (July 2026)
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 38 → 30 (-8)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443505312
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-08T01:44:22.003Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- EKhYKNKPAkojhvY4zGKg1UJ96kDSGrZkae2NVUWXEKkQ
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1523 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-08T01:44:21.765Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"12a321b4-9440-4a20-ba03-e25b6c779bc2","new_score":30,"page_slug":"across-protocol-solana-bridge-exploit-july-2026","prev_score":38,"reason":"The page is strongly sourced: 23 of 28 claims were confirmed by independent Tier 1 and Tier 2 sources, with no core allegations disputed. The revise verdict is driven by four deficiencies. First, claim_findings[12] (Across Protocol's participation in the Solana Foundation STRIDE program) could not be confirmed — sources verify STRIDE exists and names Asymmetric Research as a partner, but none specifically list Across as a participant. Second, claim_findings[14] (the Solana attacker address 8bkoZT...) has no secondary source corroboration and should be supported with a Solscan link or removed. Third, claim_findings[21] contains a minor date-framing discrepancy — the page characterizes the bridge-hack week as July 17–24 while the cited source covers July 19–25. Fourth, claim_findings[27] identifies a dead (HTTP 404) and misattributed CoinDesk URL in the sources list; the correct STRIDE article URL is cited correctly elsewhere in the page and remains live. Two high-priority coverage gaps — the promised official post-mortem and on-chain transaction citations — also warrant expansion before the page is considered complete.","score_delta":-8,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}