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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#2
Score
44 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443505484
Off-chain at
2026-08-08T02:21:05.061Z
Anchored at
Block time

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
DVHKdwFE6ytbgsJLPnCCEvVZCh3knGjqGGq1KgvJeFNk
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1013 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-08T02:21:04.867Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"511f52c7-4e0c-4b51-964e-f2259b62b80b","new_score":4,"page_slug":"atm-token-bnb-chain-exploit","prev_score":4,"reason":"The investigation's core narrative — a June 2026 BSC exploit via a flawed transferFrom() auto-swap mechanism draining ~$243,500 — is well-supported by on-chain data and consistent secondary sources. The most significant factual error is the misidentification of the PancakeSwap LP pair address (0x4fd0878...) as the ATM token contract; these are distinct contracts and the page should be corrected. A secondary concern is that all sourcing flows through two credibility-tier-2 news outlets with no first-party CertiK or TenArmor primary source cited, and the exploit transaction timestamp on-chain (June 3 UTC) does not match the stated date of June 4.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}